Chapter 8
Emigration and Start-up Setting. New Russian and Ukrainian Intelligentsia in a Historical Perspective

Volker Schulte and Andreas Hinz

Abstract This chapter describes the current situation of Russian entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and Ukrainian entrepreneurs, on the other hand, who have emigrated to a safe third country due to the warlike conflict and the increasingly repressive attitude of the Russian regime. Four Ukrainian and four Russian entrepreneurs were interviewed in addition to extensive source research. These findings are incorporated into the interpretation. Individual statements are quoted. Due to the delicate nature of statements and at the request of the interviewees, they have been anonymized. The new waves of migration are analyzed and classified in this chapter in a historical context with earlier waves of migration.

Since the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, some 700,000 Russians and 8 million Ukrainians have fled to third countries (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023a).

According to this source, about 18 million people have left Ukraine of which around 10 million have returned to the country in the meantime. The Russians and Ukrainians are mostly people with good education and corresponding skills in service professions. In this chapter, we present the results of eight interviews, four with Russian emigrants and four with Ukrainian emigrants, and explore the motivations, opportunities, and barriers to building start-ups in exile. The study also describes the integration achievements of previous European migrant flows, as well as the advantages and disadvantages for the respective home countries and for the receiving countries. From this, conclusions can be drawn for the current crisis (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023b).

Key findings: Both Russians and Ukrainians form networks. It is striking that these networks hardly mingle. "We don't want to have anything to do with the Russians," says Tatjana, an exiled Ukrainian in Switzerland. The intention, the rejection of war, and the fear of military service are common to both exile groups. The opportunities and risks of starting a business in the respective foreign countries are also comparable. Russian exiles, on the other hand, tend to be driven to neutral

V. Schulte (✉) · A. Hinz
School of Business, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland, Windisch, Switzerland
e-mail: volker.schulte@fhnw.ch; andreas.hinz@fhnw.ch

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or Russia-friendly countries. Ukrainians, on the other hand, prefer Western countries that condemn the invasion and provide significant financial support to Ukrainians in the form of asylum and refugee status. It is true that the host countries have to bear a heavy burden in the first phase, as accepting so many refugees requires great financial and social efforts. In the medium term, however, it is a significant advantage for the host countries because the admission alleviates the demographically induced shortage of skilled workers and thus promotes economic development. Among the four Ukrainians interviewed who have been granted the right to stay in Switzerland, gratitude toward the host country is very high and is expressed throughout.

Keywords Russian entrepreneurs · Ukrainian entrepreneurs · Networking in emigration · Assimilation and entrepreneurship

The War in Ukraine

The integration of Russian and Ukrainian entrepreneurs must be analyzed against the background of the horrors and traumas caused by the war. Given what has happened so far, it is remarkable that people find the strength to pursue productive independent work and do not fall into a depressive attitude.

The Ukraine war has a long history. Since 2014, Vladimir Putin has claimed the Donbass region for Russia and prepared the takeover. The Crimean Peninsula was annexed in a coup d'état in 2014. All diplomatic efforts since then have failed, as was the case in the years before with the Minsk agreements or the meetings in the "Normandy format" (Dauda et al., 2023).

Apart from human suffering, the Russian war of aggression also entails massive costs. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund currently put the cost of rebuilding buildings and infrastructure in Ukraine at the equivalent of USD 411 billion and this is considered a conservative estimate (World Bank, 2023). This is roughly twice the cost of Ukraine's 2021 GDP before the war started (International Monetary Fund, 2022).

Western countries have so far supported Ukraine with the equivalent of around EUR 113 billion. According to calculations by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (D), the EU countries provided nearly EUR 52 billion in military, financial, and humanitarian aid by the end of 2022. The pledges made by the USA amount to just under EUR 48 billion. Other states provided EUR 13.5 billion. Switzerland provided EUR 300 million for humanitarian aid (Kiel Institute, 2023).

Switzerland has taken in 81,000 Ukrainian refugees. This puts Switzerland in 15th place out of 41 European countries in terms of the number of refugees admitted relative to the population. If these figures are compared to the conflict-related European immigration waves of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1990s, it is the second-largest intake of refugees since the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990s (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023b).

The war damage and casualties, wounded and killed compatriots, leave a great trauma. In a bulletin dated June 13, 2023, the Ukrainian General Staff speaks of nearly 217,000 Russian soldiers liquidated or incapacitated (The Kyiv Independent, 2022). According to Western sources, approximately 120,000 Ukrainians are also considered dead or wounded (Washington Post, 2023b).

A more or less reliable and neutral balance is provided by the Norwegian army chief Eirik Kristoffersen: He speaks of 180,000 dead and wounded on the side of the Russian army and 100,000 dead and wounded Ukrainian army personnel. In addition, 30,000 civilians have been killed. According to the Ukrainian government, around 13,000 children and young people aged between 4 months and 17 years had been abducted by the end of 2022 (ntv, 2023).

Neutral observers confirm the abduction. Abducted children are placed in Russian re-education camps where they are subjected to Russia-centered academic, cultural, patriotic, and/or military education (Humanitarian Research Lab, 2023).

While the Western world is united behind Ukraine, Russia has lost many sympathies. Only just four countries officially support the invasion: Belarus, from where Russian troops attack Ukraine. Secondly, Iran, which supplies the Russians with kamikaze drones; thirdly, Syria, whose government stands by Moscow in the civil war; and finally, Venezuela, whose far-left president Nicolás Maduro had supported Putin. Thus, for lack of an alternative, Russia allies itself with Felt States and rogue states.

Russian Intelligentsia: a Tradition of Exodus

Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, Russia has been experiencing the largest wave of emigration since the October Revolution of 1917. A mass exodus, especially of intellectuals, is taking place. People who are culturally and ideologically oriented toward the West and who support a democratic ideology are, for the most part, trying to leave the Russian Federation while abandoning their livelihoods. Exact numbers are not available, but estimates range from several hundred thousand, and some sources even cite the number of 700,000 to over a million people (Washington Post, 2023a).

It is very difficult to give more precise figures, since the most important destination countries, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, do not require Russians to have an entry visa. However, Georgia alone expects well over 100,000 fugitives from Russia, and a similar number can be heard from Armenia. Other destination countries include Azerbaijan, Dubai, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, and Latin America. The traditionally large Russian expat regions in Montenegro, Cyprus, and the Baltic states, especially Latvia, are also seeing massive growth.

“We are experiencing the biggest brain drain in recent history,” says Russian journalist and blogger Andrei Loshak (Deutsche Welle, 2022).

They are scientists and IT specialists, journalists, bloggers, and cultural workers from all fields and genres. Russia has lost tens of thousands of highly qualified IT specialists. They were virtually driven out of the country, regardless of the economic consequences. These tech experts, once they can demonstrate language skills, usually have no difficulty finding well-paid jobs with international companies. Historical experience shows that the longer emigration lasts, the fewer of them go back to their home country.

Russia's liberal-democratic opening lasted only a decade. This must be seen against the background that it was only after the fall of the Soviet Union that a broad urban middle class began to develop, transforming the country into a modern, communications technology-based service society. The social transformation was thus short-lived and became more and more curtailed in the 2010s. But it was not until the invasion on February 24, 2022, that this brain drain began.

Meanwhile, the current regime has reintroduced post-Stalinist patterns of domination that suppress any kind of entrepreneurship. This is also expressed in the contemptuous threat of the Russian dictator Putin voiced in the media:

"Any people, and especially the Russian people, will always be able to distinguish the true patriots from the scum and the traitors, to simply spit them out like a mosquito that has accidentally flown into their mouths" (Tagesspiegel, 2022). Russia has a sad tradition of emigration of its intellectual base. Since the tsarist era, when one speaks of the Russian intellectual elite, one speaks of the "intelligentsia." The term has traditionally been applied only to a Russian intellectual setting and has often been met with opposition and led to emigration. This broad stratum of educated people, which emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century and sought to engage with the "oppressed people" regardless of their original social lineage, was seen as a symbol of liberal thought in Russia. Thus, this intellectual stratum was eminently political. Until World War I, large sections of the Russian intelligentsia strove to democratize the state order of the time. It defined itself as an intellectual phalanx in order to participate in shaping Russia's destiny. This movement was driven by the moral postulate of rejecting all forms of tyranny. It always saw itself—even in the current context—as a liberal, Western-oriented social grouping (Beyrau, 1991).

Entrepreneurship Cultures in Russia

Even before 2022, entrepreneurship and the creation of start-ups have had a hard time in Russia. In 2014, only 4.7% of working-age adults were designated as early-stage entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship continues to play only a minor role in the economy. This refers to the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) in comparison (Global Entrepreneurship Report, 2021). "In Russia, there is not only a small number of early-stage entrepreneurs. Most companies do not manage to get beyond the very first stage of development" (Igor, 16.06.2022).

With the increasing control of the state, the general lack of interest in society and, last but not least, the strong economic isolation due to the embargo measures of the West, no significant growth of the Russian business sector can be expected in the coming years. Therefore, active entrepreneurs are faced with the Sword of Damocles of failure and bankruptcy. This fear of uncertainty is also reflected in a deteriorating investment climate, which began even before the invasion of the Ukrainian heartland in February 2022 (Dekoder, 2019).

There is also a lack of transparent rules and a logic of interaction between companies and the state. "The lack of legal certainty in Russia means that few people dare to make an entrepreneurial start" (Sergey, IT Consultant). Lack of funding for new and growing businesses is one of the most acute problems for Russian companies. Access to finance for new businesses is difficult due to high-interest rates on loans.

According to the Investment Climate Report (ICS) of the International Trade Administration, an institution of the US Department of Commerce, further investments in Russia are not recommended. The analysis is based on parameters of the political environment, labor law, human rights, responsible business conduct, and anticorruption. In concrete terms, this involves issues such as investment security, protection against interference in investments to be made, a reliable legal system, the protection of intellectual property and, in general, responsible business conduct and the generally rampant nepotism (International Trade Administration, 2022).

Russia's initial success in technology entrepreneurship, as measured by output, compares favorably with benchmark countries has been completely wiped out: "Before 2014, there was a start-up and entrepreneurial culture, a great motivation to invest in the future. This culture has now been erased" (Natacha, IT entrepreneur). Previously, there was also great support in the State Duma for the creation of start-ups.

The trend toward greater start-up density, entrepreneurial growth expectations, job creation expectations, and the contribution of knowledge sectors to the economy that began in the noughties has now been completely eclipsed in favor of state actors.

Russia was the world's 12th largest economy in 2018, with a GDP of USD1.65 trillion, and was highly dependent on natural resources such as oil and gas (Country Economy, 2018).

Several sectors of the economy are dominated by large, crypto-state companies, according to Russian interviewees Sergei and Simon, with the contribution of SMEs vanishingly small. Recent economic challenges from Western sanctions have narrowed the market and deprived entrepreneurs of opportunities to grow. Russia's current path to tech entrepreneurship began with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's "Go Russia!" article in 2009, which outlined a national program for tech entrepreneurship and encouraged massive investment in technology and related infrastructure. Large-scale government efforts to promote tech entrepreneurship include the Skolkovo Integrated Free Zone, the Russian Venture Company's Innovation Fund, the quasi-government Internet Initiatives Development Fund (IIDF) early-stage accelerator, and the FAISE grant-based innovation foundation. This top-down government approach to foster innovation has resulted in a strong physical innovation

infrastructure, techno-parks have been established, and funds have been launched. "The entire entrepreneurial ecosystem is orchestrated by the state, leaving virtually no room for entrepreneurial initiatives" (Sergey, 16.06.2022). Russian consultant Simon goes even further when he says that the loss of freedom is detrimental to free enterprise, "because freedom is the key prerequisite for entrepreneurship. This was also the main reason for my departure. It is true that it will be difficult for me professionally. I now live in Serbia. I will probably have fewer career opportunities than before. With the invasion of Ukraine, the sanctions against Russia are getting stricter. This also makes life in my home country more difficult. I don't see a future for my wife, and certainly not for my children. Economic activity is slowing down, so the step to self-employment is almost impossible. Another important point for emigration is that I do not want to participate in this unjust war. This is exactly what could happen if I stayed in the country with my family" (Simon, 16.06.2022).

Simon adds that much of Russia's private sector is highly concentrated, with a small number of large companies that have neither the goal of cultivating tech entrepreneurship nor the understanding of what it takes to do so. For the most part, he said, they are apparatchiks. In his observation, this reduces the chances of success for young technology companies in terms of market entry, partnerships and exit options, investments, and acquisitions (Simon, 16.06.2022).

Entrepreneurship Cultures in Ukraine

Ukraine has developed a dynamic start-up ecosystem with the opening of the country during the "Maidan," which was abruptly interrupted or limited by the start of the war. Nevertheless, the start-up ecosystem in Ukraine still produces a number of top start-ups, although the ecosystem has dropped 16 places in the global ranking to 50th place (World Bank, 2017).

Venture capital VC funding grew steadily in Ukraine before the war, and there are more than 50 VC firms operating in the country. In 2021, before the outbreak of war, Ukrainian start-ups raised USD 832 million in VC funding. Companies are still investing in Ukraine, but the drafting of founders to defend against Russia and infrastructure problems are making some companies wary of further investment. 91% of Ukrainian start-ups needed financial support to survive the war (GTAI, 2023).

Currently, the amount of support flowing into Ukraine is helping to keep the ecosystem buoyant. For example, Google has given a grant to 25 start-ups in Ukraine so they can continue to operate and grow. The Ukrainian government is also doing its best to support start-ups, despite being forced to operate a war economy and struggling with the damage and destruction of key infrastructure. A number of non-repayable grants and other support measures are offered to companies in the technology industry and key sectors (Sokil et al., 2022).

Ukrainian Entrepreneurs in Western Europe

As mentioned at the beginning, the support of European countries toward the citizens of Ukraine is enormous. This also refers to the support of entrepreneurs and start-up representatives who have found a home in Western countries. Ludmilla, an accounting expert says: "My colleagues and I can continue our jobs here in Western Europe almost seamlessly and additionally find new business partners. The support here is enormous. Only the language barrier makes communication difficult at times." Numerous grassroot initiatives have sprung up to help them integrate into the labor and service market. For example, Deruny is a start-up that serves the recruitment of Ukrainian IT specialists and software developers in Switzerland. The company recruits new employees on behalf of employers to fill their vacancies. It undertakes the search and suggests suitable candidates to the company. "The IT sector in Ukraine is large and growing at a fast pace," said one of the company's founders (84xo, 2023).

The European Commission launched the call "Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs" (EYE) at the beginning with relatively modest additional funds of EUR 3 million in 2022. This call aims to give Ukrainian entrepreneurs the opportunity to get acquainted with the business mentality and culture in European countries (Erasmus Entrepreneurs, 2023). So far, EYE has provided networking opportunities and business connections to more than 22,000 entrepreneurs from all over Europe. In 2022, 154 Ukrainian entrepreneurs participated in the program. (Erasmus Entrepreneurs, 2023; European Commission, 2023). A new bilateral program was launched by Ukraine and the European Commission on February 2, 2023, with a budget of EUR 4.5 million (European Commission, 2023). Here, the focus was on quite concrete support measures, such as access to trade fairs and services in the European Union. The project is organized by business support organizations such as the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) as well as the European Cluster Network and others.

In the medium term, the program aims to support up to 1500 growth- and sustainability-oriented Ukrainian SMEs, even if the starting sum is rather modest at a maximum of EUR 2500. This contribution can be used, for example, to conduct market research to identify potential European partners. The funds are also used to provide legal and financial advice on setting up a new company (European Commission, 2023).

This European business bridge is also intended to get access to market alternatives also for European companies that lost Russian and Belarusian markets (angels4ukraine, 2023).

Emigration Patterns, Destinations, and Integration Strategies

The interviews, which do not permit any generally valid statements but do reveal trends, show that both Russians and Ukrainians form networks. It is striking that an overlap of these networks is rather the exception. The intention, the rejection of war and the fear of military service, is common to both exile groups. The opportunities and risks of starting a business in the respective foreign countries are also comparable.

Russian exiles tend to be driven to neutral or Russia-friendly countries. Ukrainians, on the other hand, prefer Western countries that condemn the invasion and provide significant financial support to Ukrainians in the form of asylum and refugee status.

Today's Perspectives from Experiences of the Twentieth-Century Migration Waves

Integration Experiences Using the Example of Switzerland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia

From a historical perspective, the Swiss immigration story is also a success story. In particular, the first two waves of Central Eastern European immigration, from Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, created virtually no integration problems. The emigrants were mostly well educated, the cultures not dissimilar to those of Switzerland and—like today—a great wave of solidarity and sympathy could be observed in Switzerland.

Case study Hungary

In October 1956, the people of Hungary took to the streets in a demonstration. On October 23, 1956, the popular uprising in Hungary began. The one-party regime quickly collapsed. A new government under the reformist communist Imre Nagy included representatives of the small farmers', social democrats', and peasants' parties that had been suppressed in the late 1940s, declared Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which had been formed the previous year, and the country's neutrality, and called on Soviet troops to leave. On the contrary, however, additional Red Army troops marched into Hungary in early November and installed a pro-Soviet government under János Kádár on November 4. New fighting broke out, which lasted a week in Budapest, but much longer elsewhere. After the suppression of the uprising, hundreds were executed, among them Imre Nagy in the summer of 1958. Tens of thousands were imprisoned. Non-communist parties and workers' councils formed in the wake of the uprising were again suppressed, and only after years of repression did Hungary find its way to so-called "goulash communism," which granted its citizens minor freedoms.

The Soviet invasion that followed shortly thereafter led to 200,000 Hungarians fleeing to Western European countries. As in other countries, they were welcomed with open arms in Switzerland. Since most Hungarian refugees had a solid education and shared the cultural values of the host country, they integrated very quickly and easily. Solidarity also played out among the Western countries. Although Austria was a neutral country at the time and did not belong to a Western military alliance, Austria's Western neighbors were eager to help and welcome a steady stream of refugees (Red Cross, 2023).

The integration of about 20,000 Hungarians in Switzerland was largely successful, especially since Switzerland, like its northern neighbor Germany, benefited from the "economic miracle" years, so that the Hungarian refugees could be integrated into the labor market very quickly. Language barriers were also overcome in a relatively short time. Large parts of the Hungarian educated class were proficient in German due to the long historical tradition with Austria; moreover, the refugees were already well educated (Garamvölgyi, 2014).

Prague Spring 1968

Twelve years after accepting Hungarian refugees fleeing Soviet oppression, Switzerland opened its borders to people from Eastern Europe for the second time.

Calls for reform were heard both inside and outside the CSSR Communist Party. In 1963, under the leadership of economist Ota Šik, head of the Institute of Economics at the Prague Academy of Sciences and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, a reform movement was formed that urged a fundamental renewal of the bureaucratic-centralist planned economy. Šik proposed a "socialist market economy" with worker self-management in state-owned enterprises, private small businesses, and an end to state-administered pricing. A civic intellectual stratum also emerged that called for a democratic departure from one-party socialism in addition to a technocratic one. Similar to the situation in Western countries, student protests broke out in October 1967 and were violently met. In January 1968, sharp disputes took place in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia between the orthodox wing around state and party leader Antonín Novotný and the reformers. Novotný was replaced as party leader by the reformist First Secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Alexander Dubček, and retained only the de facto insignificant post of state president. Dubček initiated a reform policy that was initially quite cautious out of deference to criticism from the other Eastern bloc countries, but which soon gained momentum and was given the label "Prague Spring" by the Western media. Ota Šik, who later taught at the University of St. Gallen, became head of the Economic Committee, and at the same time Dubček sought a reform of the federal constitution and more self-government rights for Slovakia. The action program presented on April 5, 1968, announced economic reforms, freedom of expression, information, and travel, a reappraisal of the Stalinist past, especially the show trials of the early 1950s, and a general reorientation of the Communist Party's role in society. In the West, these projects were summed up in the formula "socialism with a human face." The Soviet leadership

viewed this development as a counterrevolutionary platform and massively increased its pressure on the Czechoslovak reform Communists in July 1968 (Red Cross, 2023).

On the night of August 21, 1968, about half a million soldiers from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria marched into Czechoslovakia and occupied all of the country's strategically important positions within a few hours. East Germany, whose government had earlier urged the Soviet leadership to take military action, held back so as not to bring up memories of the German occupation between 1938 and 1945. Of the Warsaw Pact members, Romania strongly condemned the intervention, and Albania declared its withdrawal from the military alliance on September 5. There were 98 civilian casualties in the invasion; in addition, about 50 soldiers of the invading forces died. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia decided not to oppose the invasion militarily and called on the population to remain calm. Nevertheless, there were sporadic clashes between the civilian population and the invaders. More important, however, was nonviolent resistance: place-name signs and street signs were dismantled or twisted to mislead the invading troops, railroad workers directed Red Army supply trains onto sidings, and thousands of improvised posters in the cities called for passive resistance and mocked the invaders. In addition to the official radio, which remained on the air, various pirate radio stations as well as Austrian radio informed the population about the events (Wessel, 2018).

Dubček and other high-ranking members of the government were arrested and taken to Moscow. However, due to the united resistance of the population, the Soviet plan to present the invasion as a response to a call for help from the Communist Party and to present a new government of orthodox Communists could not be implemented. During the first days of the occupation, an extraordinary session of the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia even took place, which condemned the invasion and confirmed the Dubček government in office. On August 23, President Ludvík Svoboda was officially summoned to Moscow for negotiations, which, at his request, included the members of the government around Dubček who were being held in custody. The Moscow Protocol, adopted 3 days later, contained a repeal of almost all reforms. Dubček was left in his posts for the time being and allowed to return to Prague, where he was enthusiastically welcomed. Soon, however, it became clear that the Prague Spring was over. On January 16, 1969, student Jan Palach burned himself to death in protest in Prague's Wenceslas Square. A month later, Jan Zají followed suit. Because of the crushing of the Prague Spring, tens of thousands left Czechoslovakia. Some 96,000 people fled to Austria alone, and another 66,000 holidaymakers abroad did not return to Czechoslovakia for the time being. 50,000 to 60,000 remained permanently in the West. The suppression of the democratic movement in Czechoslovakia was less brutal than in Hungary, but many Czechoslovakians were completely disillusioned and decided to leave their country (Wessel, 2018).

Like the Hungarians at that time, the Czechoslovakians were welcomed with open arms by the Swiss authorities and the population. Thanks to their generally good professional qualifications and the positive economic climate, the Czechs and Slovaks were also able to integrate quickly. Switzerland accepted a contingent of 12,000 Czechoslovak refugees. They were welcome during the economic boom for

economic reasons, since most of them had a qualified education: 56% had a university degree, 17% had a baccalaureate and 26% had completed an apprenticeship (Red Cross, 2023).

Migration from former Yugoslavia

While migrants from Hungary and Czechoslovakia were still relatively easy to integrate, this was no longer quite so easy with the migration wave of the 1990s of people from the Western Balkans. These first so-called foreign workers from Yugoslavia before the Yugoslav war came mainly from the northern, more developed parts of the country, especially Croatia. In terms of mentality, they had hardly any integration problems, due to similar cultural and religious roots. The Croats had always been open to German culture and the older generation in particular had a good knowledge of German.

The integration of this first generation of foreign workers went smoothly overall. The growing Swiss labor market easily absorbed the often well-qualified and motivated workers. This first generation of ex-Yugoslavs primarily wanted to work, earn money and save, and return in the foreseeable future. Well integrated in Switzerland, most of them quickly learned Swiss German. For their children, they wanted the highest possible education. Educational awareness was a prominent trait of this generation of emigrants (Boskovska, 2000).

The 1980s brought a quantitative leap in the Yugoslav population in Switzerland. The number of Yugoslavs tripled within 10 years to 177,000, although the composition of this migrant group was completely different from that of the first wave of migration mentioned above. Catholics, the group closest to the Swiss culture and way of life, have shrunk in proportion from a third in 1980 to less than a quarter (40,000 persons, 22.7% compared to 34% in 1980). Orthodox Christians are now present in greater numbers (46,511 = 27%). With 55,453 or 32%, Muslims are now clearly the strongest group. Ten years earlier, in 1980, their share had been 17.4%. The Albanian-speaking population, mainly from Kosovo, now accounts for 21%, compared to 6% in 1980 (Sharani & Sharani, 2010). In 1970, they had no statistical relevance at all. At the same time, they form a large part of the Muslim group.

This has caused changes with 54% of those in paid work in 1990 being unskilled blue- and white-collar workers, whereas in the 1960s and 1970s it was mainly skilled workers who immigrated. Meanwhile, the proportion of children was now 22.7%. Switzerland was now seeing the arrival of primarily unskilled workers from rural areas and thus people who had to overcome greater hurdles in integrating into an urban, postmodern living environment. These changes across the Yugoslav population in Switzerland were increasingly apparent at the end of the 1980s due to rising tensions in Kosovo. With the forced immigration to Switzerland due to the Yugoslav war, the ex-Yugoslavs became one of the largest immigration groups, with 31,600 persons almost as large as the Italian migrants (Boskovska, 2008).

In terms of lifestyle and values, the almost entirely Muslim Albanians differ far more from the Swiss population than the other "ex-Yugoslavs." However, religion is of secondary importance. What is more important is that the Albanian-populated, predominantly rural areas have preserved a way of life in which the extended family and overlapping family groups are the decisive frame of reference and not the state.

There, life takes place according to customary laws. There are clear rules about what is to be done in certain situations. The prerogative of the state is often seen as interference and paternalism. Instead, people are often guided by traditional values and prescribed behavior. For Kosovars, personal responsibility for themselves and their families comes before civic and citizenship concerns (Boskovska, 2008).

Prospects for Ukrainian Migrants and Refugees

According to Aumüller (2010), full integration into a new society usually spans three generations. The first generation, depending on the difference between the migrant and recipient country cultures, experiences a "culture shock" to which it is exposed to a completely new environment. The second generation, in turn, finds itself in a situation "between cultures." On the one hand, the previous parental cultures play a major role; on the other hand, they learn social self-responsibility in the external social world. This leads to ambivalences and mental antagonisms. Only in the third generation do the ties to the culture of origin loosen and the individuals find their orientation in the culture of the host country (Aumüller, 2010).

However, from the experience of the various waves of migration over the past 50 years, it can be concluded that successful integration into society and the labor market can be achieved within one generation. This is all the more important because the Western European labor markets are suffering from a massive shortage of skilled workers. This also and especially applies to Ukrainian migrants, because they are culturally very similar to Western European societies.

Among Ukrainian migrants, the following demographic peculiarity should also be noted. Around 35% of Ukrainian refugees are children. Among the adult population, almost 80% are women. The social integration of Ukrainian refugees will therefore primarily require investments in education and childcare facilities in the short term. Thus, there is a very high positive potential for integration. According to official data, the population in Ukraine is highly qualified generally. On average, Ukrainian women have a higher level of education than men. For example, the International Labor Organization (ILO) reports the share of women with tertiary education at 63% in 2020 (Hauptmann et al., 2022).

Conclusion

At the time of writing of this chapter in June 2023, the war in Ukraine is ongoing and an outcome is hard to foresee. For both the Ukrainian and Russian diasporas, new assimilations are likely to occur, similar to the examples of political migration waves from Eastern Europe and the Balkans since the 1950s. The extent to which these two nations maintain a cultural and economic exchange with their former homeland will depend on the degree of democratization and civil society freedoms in these countries.

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Volker Schulte, Prof. Dr., is a mindfulness and resilience trainer. He studied law, history, social sciences, and education at the universities of Tübingen, Bochum, Göttingen, and New York (Fulbright Scholar). He holds a postgraduate degree in nonprofit management from the Institute for Association, Foundation and Cooperative Management VMI at the University of Fribourg and an MA in theology from the University of Salzburg. He worked for many years for the Swiss Federal Department of Home Affairs and for the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, as well as for the Directorate of Health Education of the WHO in Geneva. He also served for several years as Vice Director of Health Promotion Switzerland and as a lecturer and researcher in various universities. In 2019/20, as part of a fellowship from the Swiss National Science Foundation SNF, he guided an international research project on mindful leadership and resilience in Chile. Nowadays, he is owner of traf academy, focusing on positive psychology and leadership training.

Andreas Hinz, Prof. Dr., is lecturer and researcher at the Institute of Management, School of Business, University of Applied Sciences Northwestern Switzerland. He focuses on (Sustainable) Entrepreneurship and Innovation as well as Management. He is co-founder of Sustinova, a sustainable venture, and works as mentor at SINGA Switzerland, a startup incubator for refugees. Andreas holds a PhD in Sustainability Innovation and has done postgraduate studies in Entrepreneurship. He has work experience in Asset Management, Sustainability, and Philanthropy.