Gruntz, Dominik

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Dominik
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Gruntz, Dominik

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Secure Physical Access with NFC-enabled Smartphones

2015-12, Arnosti, Christof, Gruntz, Dominik, Hauri, Marco, Stamm, Christoph

This paper presents a smartphone-based physical access control system in which the access points are not directly connected to a central authorization server. The access points ask the mobile phone whether a particular user has access or not. The mobile phone then relays such a request to the access server. The authentication of the smartphone is based on public-key cryptography. This requires that the private key is stored in a secure element or in a trusted execution environment to prevent identity theft. In our solution we use the following secure element archiectures: Host Card Emulation (HCE) and a microSD-based secure element. We show that the HCE approach cannot solve the relay attack under conservative security assumptions and we present and discuss an implementation based on a microSD secure element that still allows the access points to connect to the authorization server upon every access albeit the access points are not connected with it.

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Publikation

Secure Physical Access with NFC-enabled Smartphones

2015-12, Arnosti, Christof, Gruntz, Dominik, Hauri, Marco

This paper presents a smartphone-based physical access control system in which the access points are not directly connected to a central authorization server. The access points ask the mobile phone whether a particular user has access or not. The mobile phone then relays such a request to the access server. The authentication of the smartphone is based on public-key cryptography. This requires that the private key is stored in a secure element or in a trusted execution environment to prevent identity theft. In our solution we use the following secure element archiectures: Host Card Emulation (HCE) and a microSD-based secure element. We show that the HCE approach cannot solve the relay attack under conservative security assumptions and we present and discuss an implementation based on a microSD secure element that still allows the access points to connect to the authorization server upon every access albeit the access points are not connected with it.