The United States and Trade Disputes in the World Trade Organization: Hegemony Constrained or Confirmed?

dc.accessRightsAnonymous
dc.audienceScience
dc.contributor.authorLindeque, Johan Paul
dc.contributor.authorMcGuire, Steven
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-08T13:10:19Z
dc.date.available2015-12-08T13:10:19Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstractDoes the World Trade Organization function to reinforce American dominance (or hegemony) of the world economy? We examine this question via an analysis of trade disputes involving the United States. This allows us to assess whether the US does better than other countries in this judicialised forum: and in so doing enhance the competitive prospects of their firms. The results are equivocal. The United States does best in the early phases of a dispute, where political power is important. It does less well as the process develops.
dc.description.urihttp://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11575-007-0042-0
dc.identifier.issn1861-8901
dc.identifier.issn0938-8249
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11654/11629
dc.issue5
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofManagement International Reviewen_US
dc.subjectWorld Trade Organization US Hegemony Trade Analysis
dc.titleThe United States and Trade Disputes in the World Trade Organization: Hegemony Constrained or Confirmed?
dc.type01A - Beitrag in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift
dc.volume47
dspace.entity.typePublication
fhnw.InventedHereNo
fhnw.IsStudentsWorkno
fhnw.PublishedSwitzerlandNo
fhnw.ReviewTypeAnonymous ex ante peer review of a complete publication
fhnw.affiliation.hochschuleHochschule für Wirtschaft FHNWde_CH
fhnw.affiliation.institutInstitute for Competitiveness and Communicationde_CH
fhnw.pagination725-744
fhnw.publicationStatePublished
relation.isAuthorOfPublication16a3f651-a6d1-4d4a-ae98-8953dbdc575b
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery16a3f651-a6d1-4d4a-ae98-8953dbdc575b
Dateien

Lizenzbündel

Gerade angezeigt 1 - 1 von 1
Kein Vorschaubild vorhanden
Name:
license.txt
Größe:
2.94 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Beschreibung: