Unreliable is better: theoretical and practical impulses for performance management

dc.contributor.authorStöckli, Sabrina
dc.contributor.authorMessner, Claude
dc.contributor.authorSterchi, Martin
dc.contributor.authorDorn, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-24T06:41:17Z
dc.date.available2024-05-24T06:41:17Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstractThis review aims to stimulate discussion about a comprehensive understanding of performance evaluation – namely, the taken-for granted benefit of maximal reliable performance evaluation, where employee performance is evaluated with high levels of reliability (i.e., large samples of performance observations). So far, the management discipline has ignored the evidence-based view that one’s performance is better under unreliable performance evaluation compared to reliable performance evaluation. Drawing on tournament theory, behavioral research, and real-world sports data, we argue that while reliable performance evaluation boosts only superior employees, unreliable performance evaluation boosts all employees. The mechanisms that drive inferior and superior employees to perform better when evaluated unreliably substantiate that psychological insight is essential for efficient performance management. Overall, we complement the predominant thinking of performance management by offering innovative insights and implications that are significant for academics, employees, and employers.
dc.identifier.doi10.5771/0042-059X-2019-2-167
dc.identifier.issn0042-059X
dc.identifier.issn2942-318X
dc.identifier.urihttps://irf.fhnw.ch/handle/11654/42460
dc.issue2
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherNomos
dc.relation.ispartofDie Unternehmung
dc.spatialBaden-Baden
dc.subject.ddc330 - Wirtschaft
dc.titleUnreliable is better: theoretical and practical impulses for performance management
dc.type01B - Beitrag in Magazin oder Zeitung
dc.volume73
dspace.entity.typePublication
fhnw.InventedHereYes
fhnw.ReviewTypeAnonymous ex ante peer review of a complete publication
fhnw.affiliation.hochschuleHochschule für Wirtschaft FHNWde_CH
fhnw.affiliation.institutInstitut für Unternehmensführungde_CH
fhnw.openAccessCategoryClosed
fhnw.pagination167-180
fhnw.publicationStatePublished
relation.isAuthorOfPublication8fd97bed-9fae-445e-bf5b-6d2e87c0eab4
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery8fd97bed-9fae-445e-bf5b-6d2e87c0eab4
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